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Disclosing Stored Communication Data
to Fight Crime: The U.S. and EU
Approaches to Balancing
Competing Privacy and
Security Interests
Elise M. Simbrot
"[T]he principle underlying this... [is] that law enforcement's investiga-
tive intrusions on our private lives, in the interests of social order and safety,
should not be unduly hindered, but must be balanced by appropriate degrees of
accountability and judicial review. "'
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Introduction
Advances in technology permit cellular service providers to create and
maintain an indefinite record of a customer's approximate location each
time a cellular telephone is used. Location data is becoming increasingly
sophisticated and precise, as service providers are required by law to incor-
porate detailed Global Positioning System (GPS) data into their tele-
phones.2 The need to accurately locate cellular telephones first arose with
respect to the increasing number of calls placed from cellular telephones to
911 emergency operators, 3 but the technology has since transcended these
boundaries.
Law enforcement authorities also benefit from accurate location
records in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime.4 One
prevalent tactic is for law enforcement authorities to seek court-authorized
disclosure of a criminal defendant's cellular telephone records to assist in
locating the defendant at the time of a charged crime, or to otherwise
incriminate the defendant.5 The ability of law enforcement authorities to
obtain this location data increases the tension between public safety and
individual privacy interests, prompting federal courts in the United States
to reevaluate how to interpret traditional laws in light of emerging location
technology. 6 More specifically, federal courts are reevaluating how to
apply traditional search and seizure law to the disclosure of historical loca-
tion data from cellular telephones. 7 This involves reconciling the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which protects citizens' privacy inter-
ests,8 with relevant statutory law, the Stored Wire and Electronic Commu-
nications and Transactional Records Access Act (SCA), which details the
proper procedure by which law enforcement can access stored communica-
tion records. 9
In a recent decision from the Western District of Pennsylvania (W.D.
Pa. Case), the court addressed the question of what standard should gov-
2. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2008).
3. See Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding Use of Cellular
Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Privacy
Concerns].
4. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter S.D. Tex.
Case 2005] ("[Using] information regarding the strength, angle, and timing of the caller's
signal ... investigators are often able to locate suspects.").
5. See id.
6. See id. at 748-49 ("The issue explored here has serious implications for the bal-
ance between privacy and law enforcement ....").
7. Privacy Concerns, supra note 3, at 312.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)-(d) (2000).
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ern law enforcement's request for a suspect's cell phone records. The Gov-
ernment argued that using cell phone records to determine a suspect's past
locations is materially different from real-time tracking, which requires a
showing of "probable cause," and therefore, historical location data should
be disclosed upon a less stringent showing of "reasonable grounds," the
level of suspicion required under the SCA. 10 The court disagreed, finding
that historical location data is not materially different merely because it
has been stored. 1 ' The arguments for protecting real-time location infor-
mation under the traditional probable cause standard also apply to histori-
cal location records. 12 Releasing data about past telephone call locations
effectively converts the cellular telephone into a tracking device, and
infringes upon a suspect's right to privacy in his or her whereabouts.
13
The court's ruling, that a request for a suspect's cellular phone records
must be accompanied by a showing of probable cause, was affirmed by the
Western District of Pennsylvania, 14 and is pending appeal before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Not all courts in the United States agree with the decision reached in
the W.D. Pa. Case. In fact, courts are divided on how to treat requests for
stored cell phone records.' 5 The case pending before the Third Circuit,
which is the first circuit to address whether the standard of probable cause
is required to obtain stored location data, carries a lot of weight because
other courts will likely look to and follow the Third Circuit's ruling.
16
This note argues that courts in the United States, and specifically the
Third Circuit, can learn from the European Union's approach to dealing
with competing privacy and security interests. The European Union issued
a Data Retention Directive (2006 EU Directive)' 7 following terrorist attacks
in New York City, Madrid, and London, with an emphasis on protecting
public safety.' 8 The goal of the 2006 EU Directive is to preserve communi-
cation records and facilitate the cooperation of law enforcement authorities
across the European Union in investigating, detecting, and prosecuting
serious crime. 19 This does not mean that the European Union ignores pri-
vacy interests in a suspect's location, but such interests are less substantial
10. W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 585 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008).
11. Id. at 603.
12. See id. at 601.
13. Id. at 616.
14. W.D. Pa. Case II, 2008 WL 4191511 at *1.
15. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation &
Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device, & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber &
Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 412 (S.D. Tex. 2007) [hereinafter S.D. Tex. Case 2007]
("Uludges have divided over the Government's ability to obtain such data .... ").
16. See, e.g., S.D. Tex. Case 2005, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2005)
("[This opinion] is written in ... hope that the government will seek appropriate review
by higher courts so that authoritative guidance will be given [to] the magistrate judges
who are called upon to rule on these applications on a daily basis.").
17. Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54 (EC).
18. Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU: The Data Retention
Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 233, 238 (2007) [hereinafter Privacy and Law Enforcement in
the E].
19. See Council Directive 2006/24, art. 1(1), 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 56 (EC).
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and do not require "rigid legal standards," such as a showing of probable
cause, to overcome. 20 Part I sets the stage for tension between security and
privacy advocates in the United States by providing background on the
evolving location-based technology required by law in cellular phones.
Part II refutes the arguments set forth in the W.D. Pa. Case-accessing
stored cellular phone records effectively converts the telephone into a track-
ing device, and alternatively, individuals have a protected privacy interest
in phone call locations-by considering why the decision is wrong under
relevant U.S. constitutional and statutory law. Part III describes the Euro-
pean Union's approach to retaining and providing law enforcement author-
ities with access to stored communication records. Part IV argues that U.S.
courts, in order to reach decisions consistent with U.S. constitutional and
statutory law, should adopt the EU approach of advancing public safety at
the cost of some, but not much, individual privacy. Specifically, the Third
Circuit should overturn the strict probable cause standard required in the
W.D. Pa. Case, in favor of disclosing stored location data pursuant to a less
stringent showing of reasonable grounds under the SCA.
1. The Tension between Privacy and Security Advocates over GPS
Enabled Phones
A. Evolving Technology Required by Law in Cellular Phones
The need to accurately locate cellular phone users first arose with
respect to the increasing number of calls placed to 911 from cellular
phones. One-third of all emergency calls are placed from cellular
phones.21 In 2001, while driving to her Florida home, Karla Gutierrez lost
control of her car and skidded into a canal. 22 Ms. Gutierrez managed to
call 911 on her cellular phone before the car submerged, but she could not
describe her exact location. 23 By the time Miami rescue units located the
accident site, Ms. Gutierrez had drowned, trapped inside the sinking car.24
If Ms. Gutierrez had called 911 from a landline phone, the emergency dis-
patcher would have received her exact location because landline phones
are matched to household addresses stored in emergency-service
databases. 25 Emergency calls placed from cellular phones, however, were
not as easy to locate because existing technologies could not automatically
trace and display the geographic coordinates of the caller to the dis-
patcher.26 As a representative from the National Academy of Emergency
Medical Dispatchers said, "Cell phones have caused a crisis in the 911
20. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 236.
21. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION OF WIRELESS ENHANCED
911 RAISES PROSPECT OF PIECEMEAL AVAILABILITY FOR YEARS To COME, GAO-04-55, (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0455.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
22. Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcastJan. 27, 2001), available at http://www.
91 ldispatch.com/video/dateline/datelinenbc-qt.html.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
26. Id.
Vol. 43
2010 Disclosing Stored Communication Data to Fight Crime 589
community." 27 To deal with the difficulties presented by emergency calls
placed from cellular phones, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) set deadlines for cellular service providers to implement more pre-
cise location technology by the end of 2005. Ultimately, cellular service
providers must be able to locate callers within 50-300 meters, depending
on how the technology is used. 28 Countries besides the United States have
embraced this location technology even beyond its use in emergencies.
2 9
While the FCC does not require cellular service providers to use a
specific technology, providers typically implement either GPS technology
or signal triangulation to locate customers through their cellular phones,
which are the two most accurate methods.30 GPS technology works by
measuring the amount of time it takes for a signal to travel between space-
based satellites and a GPS chip embedded in a cellular phone.3 1 "When
the GPS chip receives four synchronized signals from GPS satellites, it can
calculate a [subscriber's] three-dimensional location that is accurate to
within twenty meters."32 GPS technology is dependent on information
transmitted via signals between satellites and a cellular phone's GPS
chip.3 3 Locating cellular phones by means of signal triangulation relies
not on signals from a satellite, but rather on radio signals sent between a
cellular phone and a nearby cellular tower. 34 The cellular tower (or towers)
supporting the phone call registers the subscriber's general location by cal-
culating the distance between the phone and the tower using the "known
speed of radio signals."'35 A phone that is turned on continuously sends
out signals to nearby cellular towers, scanning for the best reception, and
switches towers automatically as the subscriber moves. 3 6 If three nearby
cellular towers simultaneously receive signals from a cellular phone, the
towers compare signals and triangulate a more precise location in one of
two ways.3 7 The Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) method measures the
27. Dateline NBC, supra note 22.
28. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g)(1)(v), (h)(i)-(2) (2008) ("[Providers shall b]y December
31, 2005, achieve 95 percent penetration of location-capable handsets among its
subscribers.").
29. See, e.g., Moon Iblwan & Andy Reinhardt, "Working Late" Won't Work Anymore,
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, at 40 (describing how millions of Koreans pay for a ser-
vice that sends a message if a subscriber is not where he or she should be at a specific
time and permits the tracker to see the subscriber's movements over the past five hours,
and how in Britain, parents are willing to pay $52 a year to track children's cell phones).
30. See Privacy Concerns, supra note 3, at 308.
31. James E. Holloway et al., Regulation and Public Policy in the Full Deployment of the
Enhanced Emergency Call System (E-911) and their Influence on Wireless Cellular and
Other Technologies, 12 B.U. J. So. & TECH. L. 93, 103 (2006) ("GPS is a space-based
radio navigation system consisting of twenty-four earth-orbiting satellites that broadcast
information used by the receiver, a chip embedded in the wireless phone, to calculate
the receiver's latitude, longitude, and-when more than three satellites are available-
altitude").
32. Privacy Concerns, supra note 3, at 308.
33. See id.
34. Holloway, supra note 31, at 103.
35. Id.
36. W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008).
37. See id. at 590.
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amount of time it takes for a signal to travel from a cellular phone to the
nearby cellular towers or vice-versa. 38 The Angle of Arrival (AOA) method
measures the angle at which a signal sent from a phone reaches the nearby
cellular towers. 39 The only way a subscriber can prevent a cellular phone
from sending out signals and registering its current location is to turn the
phone off.40
As people depend on their cellular phones instead of traditional
landline phones, service providers continue to upgrade cellular tower loca-
tions, especially in densely populated areas, sometimes placing towers only
hundreds of feet apart.41 The close proximity of cellular towers in densely
populated areas allows service providers to record more precise location
information, often placing a phone within 200 feet,42 and "creating a vir-
tual map of [a subscriber's] movements."'43 In rural areas, however, fewer
cellular towers exist.44 A single tower often covers several hundred square
miles and is the sole provider of reception, preventing the use of TDOA and
AOA to triangulate a subscriber's location. 45 Therefore, the accuracy of
location information depends a great deal on whether the subscriber is in
an urban or rural setting.
B. Conflicting Viewpoints-Security and Privacy Advocates in the
United States
Beyond providing emergency operators with pertinent location data,
cellular technology is also a valuable tool for law enforcement authori-
ties. 46 In 2004, police successfully located a stolen car with a kidnapped
child inside within a half-hour, by repeatedly calling the cellular phone
that the child's mother had left inside the vehicle. 47 People undoubtedly
recognize the importance of location data to law enforcement authorities in
such a situation, or to an emergency operator when callers are unaware of
their exact location. 48 However, not everyone welcomes the idea of a cellu-
lar phone being used as a locating device, considering it instead an invita-
tion to invade individual privacy. 49 Some even describe the cellular phone
as a modern tracking device, putting Justice Brandeis ahead of his time
38. Id. at 590 n.19.
39. Id.
40. See Privacy Concerns, supra note 3, at 309.
41. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records,
405 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. Case 2005].
42. W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
43. Privacy Concerns, supra note 3 at 309.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 309-10.
46. See In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 509 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D. Mass. 2007) (hereinafter D. Mass. Case] ("[C]lose proximity of cell
towers . . . makes it possible to identify with reasonable certainty the location from
which a call was made.").
47. See Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, RocKY MTN. NEws, Apr. 22, 2004, at
A18.
48. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
49. See Privacy Concerns, supra note 3, at 312.
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when he predicted in 1928 that "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the government .... The pro-
gress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire-tapping."50 Few could have imagined the tech-
nological advances that have occurred since 1928, but law enforcement
authorities continue to use new technologies to assist in their
investigations.
It is difficult to reconcile the tension that exists between the interest in
public safety and the right to individual privacy. Citizens' concerns about
the government tracking their movements without cause conflict with law
enforcement's concern that it may lose an effective tool if rules are made
too restrictive. Tension lies in the premise that usefulness of an investiga-
tion tool is "roughly proportional to its intrusiveness."''s This leaves courts
with the "prospect of balancing legitimate law enforcement goals against
deeply ensconced privacy interests of American citizens."5 2
II. U.S. Law Does Not Protect Cellular Telephone Records
One particular area of tension between security and privacy interests
arises when the government seeks court-authorized disclosure of the defen-
dant's cellular telephone records to assist in locating the defendant at the
time of the charged crime. This tension has prompted U.S. federal courts
to evaluate which standard the government is required to establish-proba-
ble cause or reasonable cause-before a court will order disclosure of a
defendant's cellular phone records. 53 Courts have to rely on and interpret
sections of the U.S. Constitution that were promulgated before location
technologies existed, and statutory laws that do not develop as quickly as
the technology itself.5 4 As a result of cellular technology challenging the
law faster than legislatures can respond and provide guidance, courts are
divided on the correct approach.55
50. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
51. lan Samuel, Note, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1325
(2008).
52. Derek P. Richmond, Comment, Can You Find Me now? Tracking the Limits on
Government Access to Cellular GPS Location Data, 16 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 283, 309
(2007).
53. See, e.g., D. Mass. Case, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (analyzing
"whether the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement ... preempts the more
relaxed [reasonable cause] provisions of the SCA ....").
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; Stored Wire & Electronic Communication & Trans-
actional Records Access Statute (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000); Richmond, supra note
52, at 309.
55. Compare D. Mass. Case, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 80, and S.D. Tex. Case 2007, 622 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 418 (granting access to historical cell phone records on showing of less
than probable cause), with W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008),
and In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing Installation & Use of a Pen
Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber & Other Info;
and (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Serv., 2006 WL 1876847, at * 1 (N.D.
Ind. July 5, 2006) [hereinafter N.D. Ind. Case] (denying access to historical cell phone
records absent showing of probable cause).
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A. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Privacy Interests in
Historical Call Locations
One issue before U.S. courts is whether government requests for cellu-
lar phone records implicate defendants' privacy protections under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 56 The Fourth Amendment
specifically protects "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, . . . and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, ...
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. ' '5 7 Courts struggle with how to apply this privacy right to the
context of location data obtained from cellular phones.
Although cellular technology is a recent development, courts have
interpreted law enforcement use of location information in light of Fourth
Amendment protections. In Katz v. United States, law enforcement authori-
ties attached a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth to
intercept the defendant's telephone conversations. 58 The United States
Supreme Court held that monitoring a closed telephone booth-which
went so far as to reveal the content of the defendant's conversations-con-
stituted an unreasonable search and violated the defendant's right to pri-
vacy.59 While this case does not provide much guidance on applying the
Fourth Amendment to historical location data obtained from a cellular
phone, it was the first case to suggest a now widely used two-part test to
determine whether a person's Fourth Amendment rights have been vio-
lated.60 Under this test, a defendant must demonstrate (1) an actual expec-
tation of privacy that (2) society is willing to recognize as reasonable.6 1
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court adopted the two-part test
originally expressed in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz. 62 Law
enforcement authorities, acting through a telephone company and without
a warrant, installed a pen register at the telephone company's central
offices to record the numbers dialed by the defendant from his landline
phone.63 Using the two-part test, the Court concluded that law enforce-
ment authorities did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
because it is unlikely that telephone users have a right to privacy in the
phone numbers that they dial.64 The defendant did not demonstrate an
actual expectation of privacy because telephone users voluntarily convey
numerical information to the telephone company in order to connect their
phone calls. 65 Even if the defendant had an actual expectation of privacy,
it was in the content of his communications, which a pen register is unable
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57. Id.
58. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
59. Id. at 353.
60. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
63. Id. at 737.
64. Id. at 745.
65. Id. at 742.
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to record.6 6 The Court refused to recognize a privacy interest in phone
numbers dialed.6 7
United States v. Knotts addressed the legality of law enforcement use of
tracking devices.68 The Court specifically considered whether a beeper
secretly placed inside the defendant's vehicle, allowing law enforcement to
use signals emitted by the beeper to monitor the defendant's location with-
out a warrant, violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 69 The
Court found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements as he traveled on public roads because anyone traveling
on the same roads could have visually observed the same information
obtained from the beeper. 70 The beeper was merely "a more effective
means of observing what [was] already public. ' 7 1 The Court distinguished
between tracking what is already public and tracking inside the "private
sphere," such as inside a person's home, where there is a recognized pri-
vacy interest under the Fourth Amendment. 72
Considering privacy interests with respect to personal, mobile com-
munication devices, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there is
no expectation of privacy in a message sent to a pager.7 3 The confidential-
ity of a message is uncertain when sent to a pager over which the sender
has no control.74 The sender takes the risk that an unintended recipient in
possession of the pager may intercept the message, or that the person
receiving the message may disclose its content. 75 The defendant failed the
first part of the two-part test-demonstrating an actual expectation of pri-
vacy-by relying on a "misplaced trust that the message would actually
reach the intended recipient. '7 6
United States v. Forest was one of the first cases to discuss the limits of
intercepting cellular phone data to reveal a defendant's general location.7 7
To monitor suspected cocaine traffickers, law enforcement authorities
obtained court authorization to intercept conversations from the defend-
ants' cellular phones. 78 Intercepted communications revealed "the immi-
nent arrival of a large shipment of cocaine."7 9 Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents attempted to keep visual surveillance of the
defendants in anticipation of the shipment, but were unable to maintain
66. Id. at 741.
67. Id. at 745.
68. 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 281-82.
71. Id. at 284. "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from aug-
menting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case." Id. at 282.
72. See id. at 282.
73. United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
78. Id. at 947.
79. Id.
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constant watch.80 In an effort to re-establish visual contact, the agents
dialed one defendant's cellular phone, hanging up before the phone had a
chance to ring, but after the phone sent out signals to the nearest cellular
towers. 8 ' Agents identified the location of the cellular phone towers being
hit and therefore, the general location of the defendant.8 2 While searching
the general area, agents spotted the defendants in their vehicle and were
able to continue visual surveillance.8 3 Following the reasoning set forth in
Knotts, the court found no violation of the defendant's privacy because the
DEA agents could have obtained the same information from the defen-
dant's visually observable location.8 4 While the Sixth Circuit in Forest pur-
ports to follow controlling Supreme Court decisions, it actually expands
law enforcement's ability to obtain information from a cellular phone with-
out a warrant. Rather than using information conveyed when the defen-
dant voluntarily made or received calls, the DEA agents dialed the
defendant's phone, inducing the phone to send out signals and register the
defendant's current location.8 5 Law enforcement authorities, however,
cannot infer from this case that there are no limits when manipulating a
defendant's personal property.
A more recent case that applies traditional Fourth Amendment princi-
ples to emerging technologies directly addresses whether the government
must demonstrate probable cause to obtain cellular phone records. 8 6 The
court in United States v. Suarez-Blanca concluded that probable cause is not
necessary because cell phone users do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information stored by service providers.8 7 The court held
that "there is no privacy interest in records kept in the [ordinary] course of
a business."8 8 The court analogized to an individual's lack of privacy in
bank records or credit card statements, 8 9 the latter of which records a cus-
tomer's location each time a purchase is made. Similarly, the location of a
subscriber's cellular phone is a record kept in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, as it is a record identifying the cellular towers through which a sub-
scriber's calls are directed.90 By voluntarily using the service provider's
equipment and conveying information to the service provider in order to
connect telephone calls, a subscriber assumes the risk that records con-
cerning the call will be retained and possibly disclosed.9 1
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Forest, 355 F.3d at 947.
84. Id. at 951 (obtaining location data from a cellular phone is "simply a proxy for
[defendant's] visually observable location.").
85. Id.
86. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,
2008).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (recognizing no right to privacy if information is in hands of third party).
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The court in Suarez-Blanca did recognize limits on law enforcement's
use of location information. Monitoring a subscriber's movements in a pri-
vate location, such as inside a home where the information is unobtainable
by visual surveillance, would infringe upon the subscriber's Fourth
Amendment rights.92 Cellular phone records, however, are only specific
enough to reveal the location of cellular towers used to support a phone
call, and are unable to pinpoint the exact location of a subscriber or defini-
tively place a subscriber within a private location.9 3 When historical infor-
mation is neither precise in its locating nor revealing in its details, the
court is not willing to afford much privacy to the customer.
94
This progression of cases suggests that cellular telephone customers
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical location data.
Records kept in the ordinary course of business fall outside Fourth Amend-
ment protections, and cellular phone records should be no exception. It
would be difficult to defend privacy protections afforded to cellular phone
records when past credit card transactions "place a person at a given loca-
tion at a specific time, yet under established Fourth Amendment law...
enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection."9 5 Subscribers do not control the
data contained in transactional records or its disclosure. 96 To the contrary,
subscribers voluntarily turn over the rights to such information each time
they use a provider's cellular equipment and services.9 7
It would also be contradictory to require a showing of probable cause
to obtain cellular phone records considering the ruling in Smith provides
law enforcement authorities with access to landline phone records on a
lesser showing,98 even though these records pinpoint customers inside a
home, a place where it is undisputed that individuals have a right to pri-
vacy. Cellular phone records are not precise enough to definitively place a
customer inside a protected space, as they reveal only the location of cellu-
lar towers used to support a call; however, 99 if courts require a showing of
probable cause before granting access, they effectively recognize these
records as more intrusive on people's privacy rights. There is no reason to
expect a higher level of privacy simply because a cellular phone moves.
92. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *9.
93. Id. at *10; see In re Application of U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installa-
tion & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; & (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber Info. &/or Cell Site Info, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (W.D. La. 2006) [herein-
after W.D. La. Case] (finding no Fourth Amendment violation because cell phone
records only locate the cellular towers used to support a phone call).
94. See id.
95. Ellen Nakashima, Judge Limits Searches Using Cellphone Data, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 12, 2008, at A02 (quoting U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan involved in
W.D. Pa. Case).
96. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
97. See id. at 743-44.
98. See id. at 746.
99. See W.D. La. Case, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
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B. Cellular Phones Not Converted into Tracking Devices
The U.S. Constitution, and specifically the Fourth Amendment, pro-
vides the framework within which to develop statutory law regarding the
proper standard for disclosing cellular phone records. Defendants often
challenge the disclosure of cellular phone records not only on constitu-
tional but also on statutory grounds. 10 0 One issue of statutory interpreta-
tion before U.S. courts is whether the government can obtain cellular
phone records under the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act (SCA) and its more lenient standard of
reasonable cause. Courts must first consider whether cellular phone
records fall outside the scope of the SCA, and its permissive use of the
reasonable cause standard, by virtue of the statute's express exclusion of
communications from a device "which permits the tracking of the move-
ment of a person or object," i.e. a tracking device. 10 1 To resolve this, courts
look at whether 18 U.S.C. § 3117-the Mobile Tracking Device Statute-is
meant to cover cellular phones.10 2 The statute vaguely and circularly
defines a "mobile tracking device" as an "electronic or mechanical device
which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object."'1 3 A
court may only authorize "installation of a mobile tracking device" if the
government demonstrates probable cause. 10 4 Some courts interpret
"installation" narrowly and limit the reach of § 3117 to devices physically
and often secretly installed by the government in personal property,
excluding a cellular phone that is knowingly possessed and used. 10 5 "The
existence of a true 'tracking device' is unknown to, and cannot be disabled
or turned off by, the person being tracked."'01 6 Courts that interpret
§ 3117 in this way broadly distinguish between a cellular phone and a
device installed by the government when defining a tracking device.
Rather than entirely exclude cellular phones from the scope of § 3117,
some courts differentiate between records of a subscriber's past locations
and real-time monitoring, finding that only real-time monitoring converts a
telephone into an imprecise tracking device. 10 7 By using vague language
in the text of § 3117(b), Congress anticipated future advances in technol-
ogy and left open the possibility that devices not originally intended or
designed to track movements, such as cellular phones, could be treated as
100. See, e.g., D. Mass. Case, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D. Mass. 2007) (challenging the
court's refusal to disclose cell phone records on a more lenient showing of reasonable
grounds, the standard set out in SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703).
101. W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 601 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008).
102. See id. at 602.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (1986).
104. Id. § 3117(a).
105. See D. Mass. Case, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 81 n.ll ("I am not ... persuaded of the
relevance of the mobile device tracking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3117, to the issue. The stat-
ute governs the 'installation' of tracking devices. The 'tracking' of a cell phone does not
require the installation of any sort of device. The telephone does the job by itself.").
106. W.D. La. Case, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006).
107. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Pro-
spective Cell Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (E.D. Wis. 2006), [hereinafter E.D.
Wis. Case], afJ'd, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006).
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tracking devices in some situations.10 8 Courts that adopt this position
require the government to demonstrate probable cause before monitoring a
defendant's cellular phone in real-time. 10 9 However, the same courts sug-
gest that historical cellular phone records are outside § 3117 and its strict
requirement that the government show probable cause to obtain them. 1 10
Assuming historical cellular phone data is not tracking information-
§ 3117 does not provide the authority to access it-the government may be
entitled to such data under the SCA standard."' 18 U.S.C. § 2703, a pro-
vision within the SCA, sets forth the procedure that the government must
follow in order to obtain customer records regarding "electronic communi-
cation service[s]," so long as the records do not contain the contents of the
communications." 2 Because the SCA does not regulate the disclosure of
content information, the contents of communications are only accessible
upon establishing a probable cause suspicion. 113 A court, however, may
order a cellular service provider to disclose information about a sub-
scriber's name, address, phone number, call records, payments, and length
and types of service' 14 on a comparatively lenient standard of "specific
and articulable facts showing ... reasonable grounds to believe that the...
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongo-
ing criminal investigation."' 1 5 The government does not even need to pro-
vide notice to the subscriber when requesting his or her records." 6 It is no
surprise that the government relies upon the argument that the SCA
applies to cellular phone records.
In response to the government's assertion that a reasonable grounds
standard is sufficient, one court-among others-agreed that it "ha[s] no
doubt that the SCA authorizes a service provider's disclosure to law
enforcement of historical cell [phone] information." 1 7 This certainty
arises from the plain language of the statute itself. § 2703 applies to
requests for stored electronic communications, 11 and provides courts
with the authority to compel service providers to disclose communication
records that are in their possession and that pertain to a subscriber of their
108. See S.D. Tex. Case 2005, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
109. See E.D. Wis. Case, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5.
110. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Regis-
ter & a Trap & Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter
E.D.N.Y. Case 2005].
111. See SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000).
112. Id. § 2703(c)(1) (excluding the content of communications from its scope).
113. See id. §§ 2703(a)-(b) (providing requirements to compel disclosure of the con-
tents of communications).
114. See id. § 2703(c)(2).
115. Id. § 2703(d).
116. See id. § 2703(c)(3).
117. E.D.N.Y. Case 2005, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
118. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of
a Pen Register Device, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (D.P.R. 2007) [hereinafter D.P.R. Case
2007].
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service. 119 Stored cellular location data appears to fall within the scope of
§ 2703 because a cellular service provider keeps records of a subscriber's
past phone call locations, and such locations pertain to the subscriber's
cellular phone service, but do not fall within the express exclusion of con-
tent communications. 120
The D. Mass. Case was the first published opinion to thoroughly
assess § 2703 and conclude that cellular phone records meet all the
requirements. 121 The court specifically concluded that cell phone compa-
nies provide electronic communications, data revealing a subscriber's loca-
tion when using the cell phone is a record pertaining to a subscriber of
such service, and location information is not content information because
it discloses nothing about a call's substance. 12 2 Other courts followed the
lead and ordered service providers to disclose cellular phone records pur-
suant to a more lenient standard of reasonable cause. 123 These courts
emphasized the limited scope of the information requested; law enforce-
ment authorities were not seeking to activate GPS capabilities on the tar-
get's phone in order to track the target in real-time or track the location of
the phone when it was not being used. 124 Courts appear more willing to
grant access to cellular phone records if the government only seeks limited
information under § 2703.125 Where a court requires the government to
provide evidence of the relevancy of cellular phone records and restricts
access to the confines of a limited request, it effectively balances interests
in security and privacy. Courts should read the SCA, as many courts
already do, to cover requests for cellular phone records and provide author-
ity for their disclosure, pursuant to a more lenient standard of judicial over-
sight as compared to that afforded to requests to monitor or track a target
in real-time.
C. The W.D. Pa. Strikes an Incorrect Balance Between Privacy and
Security
The W.D. Pa. Case rejected the conclusions that many courts reach-
the Fourth Amendment does not protect cellular phone records and access
to such records does not convert the phone into a tracking device-in favor
of requiring a strict probable cause standard to obtain cellular phone
records. 126 Magistrate Judge Lenihan denied the Government's request for
a subscriber's cellular phone records pursuant to § 2703 and accompanied
by a reasonable suspicion that the target of a drug trafficking investigation
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1); In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Prospective
Cell Site Location Info., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y.
Case 2006].
120. See D. Mass. Case, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79-80 (D. Mass. 2007).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., S.D. Tex. Case 2007, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
124. See id. at 417-18.
125. See id. at 418.
126. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008), affd, No.
07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 10, 2008).
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was using the subscriber's phone. 12 7 It was not enough for the Govern-
ment to assert that the phone records would provide valuable evidence as
to the suspect's past, and likely future, whereabouts, as well as provide the
suspect's "sources of supply, 'stash sites,' and distribution networks." 128
The court concluded that a cellular phone used to register location oper-
ates in the same way and for the same purpose as a tracking device
129
because it is an "electronic ... device which permits the tracking of the
movement of a person or object."'130 By maintaining records of a cellular
phone's location, the service provider effectively records the movement of
the person in possession. Whether a service provider releases information
about a subscriber's movements in real-time, or retains it and releases it
later in the form of historical records, it nevertheless remains information
from a device that permits tracking. 13 1 In other words, mere storage does
not alter the source or character of the information.
132
The Government argued that regardless of whether a cellular phone
has the ability to track an individual's movements, cellular phone records
are no different than other transactional records kept in the ordinary
course of business. 133 These records should be accessible under
§ 2703(c)'s reasonable relevancy standard as records "pertaining to a sub-
scriber['s]" cellular phone service. 134 To the contrary, the court found that
historical records of a subscriber's movements do not in any way pertain to
the service provided. 13 5 Customers pay for content services (voice or text),
not to have their changes in location recorded. 1
36
According to the court in the W.D. Pa. Case, even if historical cellular
location data falls within the scope of § 2703, it remains information that
traditionally requires a showing of probable cause. 137 Individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to their physical movements and loca-
tions under Fourth Amendment protections.138 "People place a certain pri-
vacy value on their movements .... Whether it's their movements yesterday
or their movements today, it's the same."'1 39 Using the two-part test first
stated in Katz, (1) individuals have an actual expectation of privacy, not
knowing that service providers create and retain a record of their move-
127. See id. at 587 ("[SCA] does not authorize access to an individual's cell-phone
derived 'location information,' either past or prospective, on a simple showing of articul-
able relevance to an ongoing investigation ....").
128. Id. at 588 n.12.
129. See id. at 602 n.44 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3117 does not require a "particular
degree of precision").
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).
131. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 588-89.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1); W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588-89.
135. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 606 n.54.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 607.
138. See id. at 610-11.
139. Nakashima, supra note 95, at A02 (quoting Catherine Crump, a lawyer with the
American Civil Liberties Union, explaining why the Government's position in the W.D.
Pa. Case was flawed).
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ments each time they use a cellular phone; and (2) this expectation is rea-
sonable because the record has the potential to locate individuals within
private property. 140 The imprecision of such records-only revealing a
subscriber's location to within a few hundred yards and unable to defini-
tively place a cellular phone within private property or detail the interior of
such private property-is overcome by the very nature of the records.
14 1
Location information is extremely personal and susceptible to abuse by
reason of the possible breadth of information that the Government could
request and the low cost and undetectable process of obtaining it.
14 2
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Warshak v. United States, made
it clear that a customer can waive a reasonable expectation of privacy by
voluntarily conveying information to a service provider that will be
accessed for business purposes. 143 Applying this standard, the court in
the W.D. Pa. Case found that cellular phone customers do not voluntarily
convey location information because the information is automatically reg-
istered, possibly without customer knowledge. 144 Also, retaining records
of customers' locations serves no business purpose other than to satisfy
government regulations. 14 5
The W.D. Pa. Case used two lines of reasoning-first, individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in move-
ments or locations; and second, cellular phones are tracking devices
excluded from the scope of § 2703-to reach the conclusion that the Gov-
ernment must show probable cause to obtain a suspect's cellular phone
records. 146 There are, however, problems specific to the case that may have
unduly influenced the court's decision. Courts are more likely to compel
disclosure of cellular phone records when the government seeks limited
information. 14 7 The Government in this case broadly sought the sub-
scriber's location records without narrowing the scope of its request. 14 8
Also, the Government requested the subscriber's records not because there
was reason to believe that the subscriber was directly involved in illegal
activity, but because there was reasonable suspicion that the suspect of a
drug investigation was using the subscriber's phone. 149 In other words,
the Government attempted to obtain the personal records of someone other
than the suspect in question. This indirect connection is too tenuous to
link the subscriber to the suspect or the suspect to the cellular phone.150 If
140. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 611-12.
141. See Nakashima, supra note 95, at A02.
142. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
143. Id. at 615 (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (pointing out that it is not enough for the location data to be accessible;
location data must actually be used by employees in the course of providing cellular
phone services).
146. Id. at 591, 607.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
148. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
149. Id. at 588 n.11.
150. Id.
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these reasons influenced the court's decision to deny the Government's
request for disclosure, the Third Circuit should make this clear.
Because the Third Circuit is the first circuit court in the United States
to address whether government requests for historical location data are
subject to the reasonable grounds standard of the SCA or the traditional
probable cause standard, this case carries a lot of weight. This note argues
that the Third Circuit should overturn the strict probable cause standard in
favor of reasonable cause because the weight of the evidence under U.S.
law, in light of EU policy, demonstrates that security interests can be
advanced without significant costs to individual privacy.
III. The EU Approach to Using Stored Communication Data to Fight
Crime
Following terrorist attacks in New York City, Madrid, and London, the
European Union put more emphasis on the security of its citizens over
privacy.15 ' In particular, the European Union passed the 2006 Data Reten-
tion Directive, compelling member states to retain mobile phone records
for a period of not less than six months and not more than twenty-four
months from the date of communication.' 5 2 The intent was to promote
law enforcement cooperation across borders and accelerate the exchange of
personal communication records to prevent, investigate, and punish crimi-
nal acts. 1 5 3
A. The 1995 EU Data Protection Directive
The European Union has not always followed an approach that pro-
motes member states exercising their security and law enforcement pow-
ers. One reason behind this is the European Union's recognition of a
fundamental right to privacy.' 5 4 All EU member states are signatories of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), under which a "right
to respect for . .. private and family life" is recognized, subject to some
limitations.155 This right to a private life is a broad term that courts have
interpreted to protect "important elements of the personal sphere" includ-
ing a person's name, gender, and sexual orientation,' 5 6 as well as a per-
son's right to information privacy.' 5 7 Within this framework, one of the
oldest policies in the European Union was the protection of data
privacy. 15 8
151. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 238.
152. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 6, 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 58 (EC).
153. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 238.
154. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
155. Id.
156. P.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 56 (2001).
157. This right to privacy under the ECHR has "been interpreted to include a right to
information privacy." See Francesca Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational
Intelligence Networks, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 663, 672 (2007) [hereinafter Towards a Right to
Privacy].
158. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 233.
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The European Union Data Protection Directive of 1995 (1995 EU
Directive) addressed concerns that liberalizing the European market would
conflict with the protection of individual privacy rights.15 9 In an inte-
grated European market, one way to encourage the free flow of information
was to set an "equally high privacy level in all EU Member States" 160 with
regard to the processing and movement of personal data.' The 1995 EU
Directive established common guidelines for collecting personal data
throughout the European Union in order to protect individuals from pri-
vacy abuses by market actors. 16 2 While the privacy protections under the
1995 EU Directive were very broad, 163 the Directive only regulated market
actors, and therefore, data collected for law enforcement and public safety
purposes was outside of its scope. 164 Beyond reasons of public safety, EU
member states could not process personal data unless they provided notice
to the data subject, 165 collected the personal data for a legitimate pur-
pose, 166 and refrained from collecting personal data that was excessive in
relation to that purpose.167 The 1995 EU Directive left open the possibility
of collecting personal data only in limited circumstances.
B. The 2006 EU Data Retention Directive
Following the terrorist attacks in New York City in 2001, Madrid in
2004, and London in 2005, the idea of preserving communication records
to fight crime gained support and shifted the focus in the European Union
from data protection to data retention.' 68 The European Parliament and
the Council of the European Union passed the 2006 Data Retention Direc-
tive (2006 EU Directive), which requires the storage of data generated in
connection with providing electronic communication services, such as
landline telephone, mobile telephone, e-mail, or other Internet services. 16 9
The 2006 EU Directive facilitates European cooperation in the "investiga-
tion, detection and prosecution of serious crime" by improving, as well as
159. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC); Privacy and
Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 233.
160. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 900 (2d ed. 2006).
161. See Council Directive 2006/24, para. 1, 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 54 (EC).
162. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 234.
163. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 1(1), 1995 0J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC) ("Member
states shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in par-
ticular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.").
164. Id. art. 3(2), at 39; Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 237.
165. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 10-12, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 41-42 (EC) (provid-
ing data subject with the right to receive notice when personal data is processed, access
all personal data, and seek rectification, deletion, or blocking of incomplete or inaccu-
rate data).
166. Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 40 ("[Plersonal data must be . . . collected for specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes .... ").
167. Id. art. 6(1)(c), at 40 ("[Plersonal data must be ... adequate, relevant, and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which [it is] collected and/or further processed
. . . . .).
168. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 238.
169. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 1(1), 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 56 (EC).
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standardizing, the information available to national authorities. 170 EU
member states must retain data regarding the location of a mobile phone
throughout the duration of a call, excluding any data that reveals the con-
tent of the call. 17 1 This is similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 that, as mentioned in
Part II.B, distinguishes between the level of privacy afforded to a phone
call's location and content.1 72 EU member states must retain location data
for a period of at least six months, but no longer than twenty-four months,
from the date of communication.1 73 After two years, the value of the data
to law enforcement authorities diminishes too much to justify continued
interference with an individual's right to privacy.'
7 4
C. EU Member States Implement 2006 EU Data Retention Directive
EU member states were required to implement the 2006 EU Directive
within eighteen months of its passing, or no later than September 15,
2007.175 However, member states had an option to postpone application
of the 2006 EU Directive for an additional eighteen months. 1 76 The United
Kingdom exercised this option, declaring its intention pursuant to Article
15(3) of the 2006 EU Directive to postpone its application to Internet com-
munications data, but not to mobile telephones. 177 Therefore, on October
1, 2007, the UK's Data Retention Regulations (2007 UK Regulations) put
the 2006 EU Directive into effect with respect to mobile telephones.' 78 The
2007 UK Regulations impose an obligation on service providers to retain
data generated in the process of supplying mobile telephone services for a
period of twelve months. 17 9 Data identifying the telephone number from
which a call is made, the telephone number dialed, the date and time of the
start and end of the call, the telephone service used, and the location of the
telephone during the call must be retained. 18 0 Service providers must also
retain data relating to a dialed, but unsuccessful call attempt.','
There are similarities between the effects on privacy under UK and
U.S. law. The 2007 UK Regulations require service providers to retain per-
sonal data generated in the process of supplying mobile communica-
170. Id.; Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 239.
171. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 5(f), 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 58 (EC).
172. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
173. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 6, 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 58 (EC).
174. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 250 (arguing that
communication data more than two years old is not useful because individuals planning
a serious crime would communicate in the two years immediately preceding the crime).
175. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 15(1), 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 60 (EC).
176. Id. art. 15(3), at 60. The majority of EU countries postponed application of the
2006 EU Directive including the Netherlands, Austria, Estonia, the United Kingdom, the
Republic of Cyprus, the Hellenic Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Slovenia,
Sweden, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Latvia, the Czech Republic, Belgium,
Poland, Finland, and Germany. Id. at 61-63.
177. The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2199 (U.K.)
(explanatory note) [hereinafter UK Directive].
178. Id. art. 1.
179. Id. arts. 4(1)-(2).
180. Id. art. 5.
181. Id. art. 4(3).
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tions. 18 2 Likewise, there is no protected privacy interest in records kept in
the "ordinary course of business" under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 183 Whether location data qualifies as data produced in the
course of business and therefore, is excluded from extensive privacy protec-
tions, varies between the two countries. As noted in the W.D. Pa. Case,
U.S. courts have not definitively decided whether a cell phone customer's
location records pertain to the services provided. 18 4 In contrast, the
United Kingdom characterizes a customer's location records as data gener-
ated in the process of supplying mobile communication services. 18 5 While
both countries exempt records kept in the course of business from privacy
protections, they disagree as to what is considered a business record.
IV. Evaluation of the EU Approach
Although the European Union and the United States have different
approaches to data protection, the United States could learn from the EU
approach of advancing law enforcement and security efforts at the cost of
some, but not much, individual privacy. The 2006 EU Directive demon-
strates how the EU member states cooperate in order to prevent serious
crime, while still complying with the fundamental right to "private life"
under the ECHR. 186 Put differently, the 2006 EU Directive effectively
addresses the fear in the W.D. Pa. Case of sacrificing too much in the way
of individual privacy.
A. Recognizing Different Conceptions of Privacy
The U.S. and EU ideas of data protection differ in many respects.187
This stems from two different conceptions of privacy, which lead to differ-
ences in privacy laws. 188 The U.S. conception of privacy is a right of free-
dom from government intrusion. 18 9 There is no affirmative duty to put
legislation in place to protect individual privacy rights because the rights
themselves shield against unlawful interference. 190 Privacy in the United
States is a narrow concept, focusing on the "physical places and personal
182. Id. arts. 4(1), 5.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr.
21, 2008) ("[N]o privacy interest in records kept in the [ordinary] course of a business
... . .).
184. See W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F.Supp.2d 585, 605-06 (W.D. Pa. 2008), affid, No.
07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 10, 2008).
185. See UK Directive, 2007, S.I. 2007/2199, arts. 4(1), 5(2)(e) (U.K.).
186. See Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 249.
187. See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of
the European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807, 815 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy] ("European and American concepts of
privacy differ in important respects, a fact that has far-reaching consequences for their
information privacy regulation.").
188. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1160 (2004).
189. Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy, supra note 187, at 817; Whitman,
supra note 188, at 1161.
190. Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy, supra note 187, at 817.
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facts which, if invaded or disclosed, would offend common expectations of
privacy."'19 1
In contrast, the EU conception of privacy is based not upon a right to
be free from intrusion, but rather upon a right to personal dignity. 192 This
positive right imposes a duty on the state to safeguard informational pri-
vacy. 19 3 For example, German privacy laws protect the "rights to one's
image, name, and reputation."194 A privacy right based upon personal dig-
nity provides individuals with more access to and control over the personal
information that is disclosed. 195 This is reflected in the 1995 EU Directive
where, absent concerns for public safety, 19 6 there are general requirements
to provide notice to the data subject, 19 7 collect accurate data,19 8 and allow
a subject to access personal information that is being processed. 19 9 Indi-
viduals in the European Union have more "rights to control [their] public
image" and the way that others view them.20 0 While EU privacy protec-
tions broadly apply to all types of personal information,2 0 1 the European
Union carves out exceptions, limiting privacy protections in circumstances
where public safety is at issue. 2 °2
Different conceptions of privacy in the European Union and United
States lead to different legal standards to obtain location data. In the Euro-
pean Union, the law of data protection, rather than the law of criminal
procedure as used in the United States, governs access to personal location
data.20 3 There are some similarities between the two approaches. For
example, data protection law, much like U.S. criminal procedure, limits the
amount and type of personal information available to law enforcement
authorities. 20 4 However, the legal standards to obtain personal data in the
European Union, including location data, are more flexible. 20 5 Authorities
can obtain location data without a strict showing of probable cause-as
advocated in the W.D. Pa. Case-so long as the data is relevant, used for
purposes related to the criminal investigation, and expunged or made
anonymous once it is no longer needed.20 6 Even before the European Par-
191. Id. at 816.
192. Whitman, supra note 188, at 1161.
193. Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy, supra note 187, at 816-17.
194. Whitman, supra note 188, at 1161.
195. Id. (describing German privacy law as a "right to informational self-determina-
tion-the right to control the sorts of information disclosed about oneself."); see also
Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy, supra note 187, at 816.
196. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 13(1), 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC) (allowing
government to restrict the scope of privacy protections when necessary to safeguard
national security, defense, and domestic law enforcement).
197. See id. arts. 10-11, at 41-42.
198. See id. art. 6(1)(d), at 40.
199. See id. art. 12, at 42.
200. Whitman, supra note 188, at 1161.
201. See Towards a Right to Privacy, supra note 157, at 672.
202. See ECHR, art. 8(2).
203. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 236.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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liament and the Council of the European Union passed the 2006 EU Direc-
tive, national authorities only prevented the transfer of personal data from
one EU member state to another three times as a result of privacy con-
cerns.20 7 The European Union's flexible approach to storing and transfer-
ring personal location data lends itself as a valuable option for fighting
serious crimes.
Another crucial difference between U.S. and EU perceptions of privacy
and resulting legal standards to obtain location data is whether the right to
privacy is balanced against government interests. The European Court of
Human Rights interprets Article Eight of the ECHR as prohibiting authori-
ties from storing personal data because it interferes with an individual's
right to a private life, 20 8 unless three conditions are met.20 9 One of the
three conditions-all of which will be discussed in greater detail 2 1° -
requires a proportional interference with an individual's private life.2 11
Proportionality under EU law implies balancing the importance of the pri-
vacy right against the importance of the public purpose and searching for a
less intrusive way to accomplish the same purpose. 2 12 Law enforcement
authorities carry the burden of establishing that the interference is propor-
tional, and the burden will vary with the privacy right at stake and the
public purpose pursued.2 1 3 The European Union recognizes a fundamen-
tal right to privacy, but permits balancing where the purpose is investigat-
ing, detecting, and prosecuting serious crimes. Conversely, the U.S. court
in the W.D. Pa. Case requires the Government to demonstrate probable
cause in order to obtain personal location data relevant to the criminal
investigation, 214 with no hint of balancing the importance of the privacy
right at stake against the public purpose. The court appears to treat the
fundamental right to privacy as a trump card.
B. Exploring Reasons to Adopt the EU Approach
The 2006 EU Directive strikes a delicate balance between retaining
location data to facilitate cooperation in fighting serious crime, 2 15 and
complying with the right to private life under Article Eight of the ECHR,
207. Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy, supra note 187, at 843-44 (noting
that all three cases involved transfers of data to countries lacking any type of legislation
on information privacy).
208. See e.g., Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 44, 46
(2000).
209. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 242 (describing the
three conditions that justify storing personal data as interferences that are (1) author-
ized by law, (2) in pursuit of a legitimate purpose, and (3) proportional).
210. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
211. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 242.
212. Id. ("If the [privacy] right is sufficiently important and there are alternative
means of accomplishing the public purpose, proportionality is breached.").
213. Id. at 246.
214. W.D. Pa. Case, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008), affid, No. 07-524M,
2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 10, 2008).
215. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 1(1), 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 56 (EC).
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which cautions against storing personal data. 2 16 As mentioned in Part
IV.A, the European Court of Human Rights interprets Article Eight to per-
mit authorities to interfere with the right to privacy and store personal data
for the purpose of fighting crime, only if three conditions are met.21 7 The
interference must be "in accordance with the law,"2 18 in pursuit of a legiti-
mate purpose, 2 19 and proportional and no more than necessary to achieve
that purpose.2 20
The 2006 EU Directive meets all three conditions to permit a public
authority to interfere with private life. To retain and use location data, it
must first be "authorized by a law, [that is] accessible to the public, with
precise enough provisions to curb arbitrary government action and to put
citizens on notice of possible incursions into their private sphere." 22 1 In
other words, individuals must know the basis for an intrusion into their
private life, as set out in law, to justify such an intrusion by a public
authority. 2 22 The 2006 EU Directive fulfills this first condition by author-
izing member states to store and use personal data regarding the location
of calls made from mobile phones. 2 23 Second, the purpose for storing
location data must fit one of the legitimate purposes listed in Article Eight
of the ECHR, which includes preventing crime, and because it does not
specify what type of crime, arguably to prevent any crime.2 2 4 Although the
2006 EU Directive could broadly permit member states to retain location
data to prevent all crimes, it instead has a narrow scope that permits mem-
ber states to retain location data for the purpose of investigating, detecting,
and prosecuting only serious crimes.
2 2 5
Using personal data only in connection with serious crimes also
applies to the third condition-interference with the right to privacy must
be proportional and no more than necessary to pursue the legitimate aim.
216. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public Electronic Communication Ser-
vices and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, para. 9, 2005 OJ. (C 298) 1, 2 (EC) [herein-
after Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor].
217. See e.g., Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 45-46
(2000) (intercepting and recording a phone call is "'interference by a public authority',
within the meaning of Article 8(2)" and is a breach of the right to private life under
Article 8(1) unless the justification for the interference satisfies three conditions).
218. Id. para. 46.
219. ECHR, art. 8(2) ("[No interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
[privacy] right except . . . in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
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220. Amann, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 46.
221. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 242.
222. See e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. para.
49 (1979) ("IT]he law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must ... have an indi-
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Pursuit of a legitimate aim, such as preventing crime, will not alone justify
violating an individual's right to privacy if the approach used to prevent
crime is excessive. "[Tihe state cannot use a sledgehammer to crack a
nut."2 26 To comply with the requirement of a proportionate interference,
the 2006 EU Directive prohibits member states from retaining data for
more than twenty-four months, 22 7 or storing the content of telephone con-
versations at all. 22 8 The 2006 EU Directive "retain[s] less data for a shorter
time,"' 22 9 and complies with the idea that the privacy interest in when,
where, and to whom cellular phone calls are made is less substantial than
the privacy interest in the content of the calls.2 30 Also, the 2006 EU Direc-
tive does not allow law enforcement authorities to make broad requests for
information, requiring them to complete thorough requests for information
with respect to specific telephone numbers linked to suspected criminal
activity.2 3 1
Not only does the 2006 EU Directive comply with the right to privacy
on its own, but in 2008, the European Union issued a Protection of Per-
sonal Data Framework Decision (2008 EU Framework Decision) to ensure
that personal data used in the "fields of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters" is protected. 2 3 2 The 2008 EU Framework Decision reit-
erates the three principles of lawfulness, legitimate purpose, and propor-
tionality when collecting and processing data, 23 3 requires member states
to verify the quality and accuracy of personal data,234 limits the situations
in which authorities may transmit data across borders as well as the people
who may receive the data, 23 5 requires member states to inform the data
subject about the collection of personal data,23 6 and obliges member states
to implement measures designed to protect data against "destruction[,]...
loss, alteration, [and] unauthori[zled disclosure or access."23 7
The 2008 EU Framework Decision should not be viewed in isolation
to indicate that the European Union is taking a step away from its empha-
sis on security, but rather, it should be interpreted in connection with the
2006 EU Directive. Together, they represent the European Union's balance
of two competing ideals-protecting the right to privacy while also enhanc-
ing public safety. One way to understand the 2008 EU Framework Deci-
sion is to view it as developing mutual trust between member states' law
enforcement authorities. Putting guidelines in place to protect personal
226. PHILIP PLOWDEN & KEVN KERRIGAN, ADvocAcy AND HUMAN RIGHTS: USING THE
CONVENTION IN COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 39 (2002).
227. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 6, 2006 OJ. (L 105) 54, 58 (EC).
228. Id. art. 5(2), at 58.
229. Privacy and Law Enforcement in the EU, supra note 18, at 249.
230. Id. at 236.
231. Id. at 252.
:232. Council Framework Decision 2008/977, art. 1(1), 2008 OJ. (L 350) 60, 64
(EC).
233. Id. art. 3(1), at 65.
234. Id. art. 8, at 66.
235. Id. arts. 13-14, at 67-68.
236. Id. art. 16(1), at 68.
237. Id. art. 22(1), at 69.
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communication records exchanged across borders prevents a barrier to
state cooperation. States are more likely to cooperate in an initiative if it
simultaneously respects their citizens' privacy rights. The 2006 EU Direc-
tive permits authorities to store and use personal communication records
to prevent serious crime, but in connection with the protections of the
2008 EU Framework Decision, it does not require member states to sacri-
fice too much in the way of individual privacy. The fears of U.S. privacy
advocates-that providing access to personal location data will encourage
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country" 238 and even-
tually undermine privacy rights completely-have not come true in the
European Union.
Conclusion
Until the Third Circuit, and ultimately, the Supreme Court, consider
the issue of what standard is required to obtain stored location data, the
protection afforded this data remains uncertain, and lower U.S. courts will
continue to reach conflicting results. This note narrowly focuses on the
decision reached in the W.D. Pa. Case-requiring probable cause to obtain
records of the defendant's cellular phone call locations-and why it should
be overturned under existing U.S. law and with reference to EU law. If the
W.D. Pa. Case involved tracking a defendant's location through a cellular
phone in real-time or disclosing the content of a past phone call without a
showing of probable cause, the analysis and conclusions in this note would
likely be different.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect pri-
vacy interests in historical call locations. There is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because the documented location is imprecise, unable to
definitively place a person within a constitutionally protected space, and is
part of a record kept by service providers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Without Fourth Amendment protection, § 2703 of the SCA allows
the government to obtain cellular phone records absent a probable cause
warrant. The standard of access under § 2703 is, and should be, a show-
ing of reasonable grounds to believe that the information is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation.
The United States can also learn from how the European Union bal-
ances competing privacy and security interests. The devastating impact of
terrorist attacks in New York City, London, and Madrid was the driving
force behind the 2006 EU Directive, put in place to encourage member
states to cooperate in the prevention of serious crime. It directs EU mem-
ber states to retain and share mobile communication data, including the
location of customers' past phone calls. The proper authorities may obtain
location data without probable cause, so long as the data is relevant and
used for purposes related to the criminal investigation. This flexible
approach allows the European Union to emphasize public safety without
238. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983).
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sacrificing too much in the way of individual privacy. The interests of pub-
lic safety and consistency in lower court decisions require that the United
States take a similar approach. The Third Circuit overturning the decision
in the W.D. Pa. Case would be a step in the right direction toward imple-
menting the EU approach and ruling consistently with U.S. law.
Considering that U.S. courts have yet to reach a consensus about how
to treat stored location data, another approach is for Congress to step in
and clarify the judiciary's role under the SCA-the statutory scheme in
place for electronic communications-and pass legislation to fill in the
gaps. The problem is formulating legislation specific enough so that
courts know how to treat existing technologies, but not too specific as to be
out-of-date each time there is a technological advancement.239 Vague legis-
lation is a "necessary and inevitable evil" where the technology in question
rapidly evolves, but it can still provide guidelines for regulating existing, as
well as future, technology. 240 Going forward, the stage is set for either
Congress or the Third Circuit to address the correct standard for access to
stored location data and in effect, the appropriate balance for competing
privacy and security interests in a post-9/11 world.
239. Richmond, supra note 52, at 318-19.
240. Id. at 319.
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